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Abstract
In the past, several models of consciousness have become popular and have led to the development of models for machine con-
sciousness with varying degrees of success and challenges for simulation and implementations. Moreover, affective computing
attributes that involve emotions, behavior and personality have not been the focus of models of consciousness as they lacked moti-
vation for deployment in software applications and robots. The affective attributes are important factors for the future of machine
consciousness with the rise of technologies that can assist humans. Personality and affection hence can give an additional flavor
for the computational model of consciousness in humanoid robotics. Recent advances in areas of machine learning with a focus on
deep learning can further help in developing aspects of machine consciousness in areas that can better replicate human sensory per-
ceptions such as speech recognition and vision. With such advancements, one encounters further challenges in developing models
that can synchronize different aspects of affective computing. In this paper, we review some existing models of consciousnesses
and present an affective computational model that would enable the human touch and feel for robotic systems.
Keywords: Machine consciousness, cognitive systems, affective computing, consciousness, machine learning
1. Introduction
The definition of consciousness has been a major challenge
for simulating or modelling human consciousness [1, 2]. How-
soever, a broad definition of consciousness is the state or quality
of awareness which features sentience, subjectivity, the ability
to experience through sensory perceptions, the state of wakeful-
ness, the sense of ego, and the control of the mind with aware-
ness of thought processes [3, 4, 5, 6, 7].
The challenges in the definition and models of conscious-
ness affects the implementation or simulation study of con-
sciousness. In the past, simulation study has been presented
for certain models of consciousnesses, such as the model of
information flow from global workspace theory[3]. Shanahan
presented a study where cognitive functions such as anticipa-
tion and planning were realised through internal simulation of
interaction with the environment. An implementation based on
weightless neurons was used to control a simulated robot [8].
Further attempts were made to model specific forms of intel-
ligence through brute-force search heuristics to reproduce fea-
tures of human perception and cognition, including emotions
[7].
Moreover, small scale implementations can consider mod-
els based from consciousness in animals that are needed for
their survival. Although intelligence demonstrated in solving
the tasks vary [9, 10], limiting definitions of consciousness to
humans is speculative as all living beings tend to have cer-
tain attributes that overlap with human consciousness. Some
of the undomesticated animals such as rodents have a history
of survival in challenging and wide range of climate and envi-
ronments [11]. There are some studies that show that animals
such as rats seem to express some aspects of consciousnesses,
that is not merely for survival. They feature social attributes
such as empathy which is similar to humans [12, 13]. High
level of curiosity and creativity are major attributes of con-
sciousness which could be a factor that distinguishes humans
from rest of the animals [14, 15, 16]. While intelligence is
also an underlying aspect of consciousness, it has been shown
that intelligence is a necessary, however, not sufficient condi-
tion for creativity [17]. Howsoever, apart from humans, other
animals also show certain levels of creativity [18]. There has
been attempts to enhance existing models in unconventional
ways through means to incorporate non-materialistic aspects
of consciousnesses through studies of near-death experiences
[19]. Furthermore, ideas from psychology and quantum me-
chanics have also been integrated in a study that challenge the
materialistic view of consciousness [20].
In an attempt to empirically study consciousness, Tononi
proposed the information integrated theory of consciousness to
quantify the amount of integrated information an entity pos-
sesses which determines its level of consciousness [21]. The
theory depends exclusively on the ability of a system to inte-
grate information, regardless of having a strong sense of self,
language, emotion, body, or an environment. Furthermore, it
attempts to explain why consciousness requires neither sen-
sory input nor behavioural output in cases such as during the
sleeping state. Further work was done with application of
integrated information to discrete networks as a function of
their dynamics and causal architecture [22]. Information in-
tegrated theory 3.0 further refined the properties of conscious-
ness with phenomenological axioms and postulates to lay out
a system of mechanisms to satisfy those axioms and thus gen-
erate consciousness [23]. It was suggested that systems with
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a purely feed-forward architecture cannot generate conscious-
ness, whereas feed-back or recursion of some nature could be
an essential ingredient of consciousness. This was based on a
previous study, where it was established that the presence or ab-
sence of feed-back could be directly equated with the presence
or absence of consciousness [24].
David Chalmers highlighted the explanatory gap in defin-
ing consciousness and indicated that the hard problem of con-
sciousness emerge from attempts that try to explain it in purely
physical terms [1]. Integrated information theory is based
on phenomenological axioms which begins with consciousness
and indicates that complex systems with some feedback states
could have varying levels of consciousness [23]. Howsoever,
this does not fully support the motivations for consciousness
experience as defined by Chalmers that look at conscious expe-
rience or qualia from first and third person perspectives and the
relationship between them [25].
The field of affective computing focuses on the development
of systems that can simulate, recognize, and process human af-
fects which essentially is the experience of feeling or emotion
[26, 27, 28]. Affective computing could provide better commu-
nication between humans and artificial systems that can lead to
elements of trust and connectivity with artificial systems [29].
The motivation to have affective models in artificial conscious-
ness would be towards the future of mobile technologies and
robotic systems that guide in everyday human activities. For in-
stance, a robotic system which is part of the household kitchen
could further feature communication that builds and connectiv-
ity from features of affective computing [30]. In the near future,
there will also be a growing demand for sex robots, therapeu-
tic and nursing robots which would need affective computing
features [31, 32]. Moreover, the emergence of smart toys and
robotic pets could be helpful in raising children and also assist
the elderly [32]. Although mobile application-based support
and learning systems have been successfully deployed, they are
often criticized for having less physical interactions [33]. In
such areas, affects in robots could lead to further help such as
stress management and counselling.
Personality is an integral part of consciousness [34]. How-
ever, in the past, the proposed models of consciousness have
not tackled the feature of personality [35]. In the past, a study
presented the influence of different types of personality on work
performance for selection, training and development, and per-
formance appraisal of workers [34]. Nazir et. al further pre-
sented culture-personality based affective model that included
the five dimensions of personality [36]. Carver and Scheier
used control theory as a conceptual framework for personality
which provides an understanding of social, clinical and health
psychology [37]. Although these studies have been very popu-
lar in areas of psychology, there has not been much work done
to incorporate understanding of personality in models of ma-
chine consciousness.
We note that element of hunger and pain are some of the lead-
ing biological attributes for survival which contributes to hu-
man personality and affects. Starzyk et. al presented motivated
learning for the development of autonomous systems based on
competition between dynamically-changing pain signals which
provided an interplay of externally driven and internally gener-
ated control signals [38]. The use of abstract notion of pain as a
motivational behaviour for a goal such as food can lead to fea-
tures in affective model for machine consciousnesses. Although
several prominent models of machine consciousness have been
present, their limitations exist in terms of addressing the fea-
tures of human affects that could lead future implementations in
robot systems and other related emerging technologies. In such
systems with human affects, there would be a wider impact in
terms of social acceptance, trust and reliability. However, the
limitations that exist in humans could also pose a threat. We
limit our focus on the development of affects that could lead to
personality in artificial consciousness without much emphasis
for implications or social acceptable of such systems.
In this paper, we review some existing models of conscious-
nesses and present an affective computational model of machine
consciousness with the motivation to incorporate human affects
and personality. We promote a discussion of using emerging
technologies and advances in machine learning for developing
the affective computational model.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II pro-
vides a background on consciousness and existing models. Sec-
tion III presents the proposed model and Section IV provides
a discussion with further research directions while Section V
concludes the paper.
2. Background and Related Work
2.1. Studies of consciousnesses
Although certain foundations in the definition of conscious-
ness have emerged [3, 4, 6], there has been the need for a def-
inition that can fulfill the needs from the perspective of vari-
ous fields that include neuroscience, psychology and philoso-
phy. Historically, the study of consciousnesses has been the
subject of various groups and phases in ancient and modern his-
tory that include those both from Eastern [39, 40] and Western
philosophical traditions [41].
There are some difficulties in defining consciousness that led
to identifying areas known as the easy and the hard problems of
consciousness [42, 43] from perspectives of neurobiology and
neurophilosophy. Chalmers introduced the hard problem which
highlights the explanatory gap of defining the conscious expe-
rience, though which sensations acquire characteristics, such as
colors and taste [1]. The rest of the problems are the ’easy prob-
lems’ that generally refer to the functions such as accessibility
and reportability, howsoever, they are also unsolved problems
in cognitive science [1, 25]. The easy problems of conscious-
ness constitute of the ability to discriminate, integrate infor-
mation, report mental states, and focus attention. These could
be deduced and modeled through advances in artificial intel-
ligence [44]. Chalmers also proposed a pathway towards the
science of understanding consciousness experience through the
integration of third-person data about behavior and brain pro-
cesses with first-person data about conscious experience [25].
Moreover, the easy problems in consciousness could be tackled
by constructs in weak artificial intelligence (AI) [45]. Note that
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strong AI refers to the notion that machines can think similar to
humans and possess some level of consciousness and sentience,
while weak AI refers to machines that can be made to act as if
they are intelligent [45].
There have been also been concerns about the ability of neu-
roscience to explain properties of consciousness [46, 1, 47].
Chalmers argued that neuroscience is good in explaining easy
problems of consciousness and faces major challenges in the
hard problems [1]. The mind-body problem is one of the his-
torical challenges about the nature of consciousness [48]. In
this problem, there is dilemma about the relationship of the
mind with the brain since mental states and processes such as
thinking are non-physical while the human body is a physi-
cal entity [49, 50]. Uncertainties in definitions of conscious-
ness [2] have been also promoting views of consciousness that
have been more metaphysical and spiritual [51, 52]. There has
also been evidence of consciousness related abnormalities in
physical systems suggesting that consciousness can alter the
outcome of certain physical processes such as random-number
generators [53]. Although these topics are interesting, certain
restrictions need to be placed in the development of machine
consciousness that can lead to the development of robotics and
other related intelligent systems that can assist in human deci-
sion making and also carry out everyday tasks. We, therefore,
limit out definition of consciousness merely to that which can
help in the formulation of problem-solving techniques, which
may restrict to models relation to information theory of con-
sciousness [54] that could lead to software systems or models
that to replicate consciousness to a certain degree.
One of the issues of the mind-body problem has been in the
explanation of the links that govern the physical (brain) with
the non-physical (mind). This can be seen as analogous to the
relationship between hardware and software systems. Wang
presented a study with a comprehensive set of informatics and
semantic properties and laws of software as well as their math-
ematical models [55]. In order to provide a rigorous mathemat-
ical treatment of both the abstract and concrete semantics of
software, a new type of formal semantics known as the deduc-
tive semantics was developed. Later, a theoretical framework of
cognitive informatics that was shown to be a trans-disciplinary
inquiry of the internal information processing mechanisms and
processes of the brain and natural intelligence [56]. Further-
more, Wang et. al presented an architecture, theoretical founda-
tions, and engineering paradigms of contemporary cybernetics
with a link to computational intelligence has been introduced
in the cybernetic context and the compatibility between natural
and cybernetic intelligence was analyzed[57]. Moreover, Wang
presented a formal model and a cognitive process of conscious-
ness in order to explain how abstract consciousness is gener-
ated. The hierarchical levels of consciousness were explored
from the facets of neurology, physiology, and computational
intelligence. A rigorous mathematical model of consciousness
was created and the cognitive process of consciousness is for-
mally described using denotational mathematics [58]
2.2. Existing models for machine consciousness
Over the last few decades, various attempts have been made
to use studies of consciousnesses for models or development of
machine consciousness. While there are various models with
certain strengths and limitations, in general, there lacks simula-
tion study for these models. Gamez initially presented a review
of the progress in machine consciousness where the literature
was divided into four groups that considered of the external
behavior, cognitive characteristics, architecture that correlates
with human consciousness, and phenomenally conscious ma-
chines [59]. Reggia later presented a review where machine
consciousness was classified into five categories based on re-
curring themes on the fundamental issues that are most central
to consciousness [60]. These included a global workspace, in-
formation integration, an internal self-model, higher-level rep-
resentation, and attention mechanisms. With a number of chal-
lenges related to definition and understanding of consciousness,
it was highlighted that the way forward to examine the inter-
relationships between the five approaches. Hence, it will re-
main very difficult to create artifacts that truly model or support
analogous artificial conscious states.
Although various models have been discussed in detail in the
reviews, we limit our discussion to some of the recent models
that closely relative to this paper. Starzyk and Prasad presented
a computational model of machine consciousness which was
driven by competing motivations, goals, and attention switch-
ing through the concept of mental saccades [61]. Reggia ar-
gued that the efforts to create a phenomenally conscious ma-
chine have not been much less successful due to the computa-
tional explanatory gap which refers to the inability to explain
the implementation of high-level cognitive algorithms in terms
of neuro-computational processing [62]. It was highlighted at
the present time, machine consciousness has not presented a
compelling demonstration of phenomenal consciousness and
further has not given any indications for it to emerge in the fu-
ture.
The social and cognitive aspects that deal with attention and
awareness can be helpful in further understanding certain as-
pects of consciousnesses [63]. Graziano and Kastner presented
a hypothesis where they viewed awareness as a perceptual re-
construction of the attentional state. They proposed that the ma-
chinery that computes information about other peoples aware-
ness is the same machinery that computes information about
our own awareness [64]. They proposed that attention and the
attention schema co-evolved over the past half-billion years and
may have taken on additional functions such as promoting the
integration of information across diverse domains and promot-
ing social cognition. Their hypothesis further leads to a mecha-
nistic theory of consciousness that outlined how a brain with an
attention schema may conclude that it has subjective awareness
[65]. In the attention schema theory, consciousness is viewed
beyond philosophy, towards developing basic properties can be
engineered into machines. It is seen as a fundamental part of the
data processing machinery of the brain where awareness is an
internal model of attention. They further argued that the atten-
tion schema theory provides a possible answer to the puzzle of
subjective experience whereby the brain computes a simplified
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model of the process and the current state of attention which is
the basis of subjective reports [66]. Moreover, the theory was
partially based on the logic of model-based control motivated
by how the brain computes a model of the body through the
body schema and uses it in the control of the body. Hence, they
suggested that a simplified model of attention through an atten-
tion schema would be useful in controlling attention. Lamme
presented definitions of visual attention and awareness that dis-
tinguished between them and also explained why they are intri-
cately related. It was suggested that there was overlap between
mechanisms of memory and awareness than between those of
attention and awareness. Moreover, it was also highlighted that
phenomenal experience origin from the recurrent interaction
between groups of neurons [24].
2.3. Simulation of aspects of consciousness
Throughout modern digital history, there have been a num-
ber of developments in areas of artificial intelligence that mimic
aspects or attributes of cognition and consciousness. These de-
velopments have been made with the hope to replicate and auto-
mate some of the tasks that are undertaken by humans given the
industrial demand and constraints of humans on carrying out
demanding tasks in limited time. The replication of some of the
biological attributes include the feature of learning with ma-
chine learning [67] and the attribute of reasoning and planning
with automated reasoning [68]. The attribute which deals with
sensory perceptions includes the sense of hearing with speech
recognition which covers areas such as voice and speaker iden-
tification [69]. Moreover, visual perception is covered through
computer vision [70] with specific cases such as face [71], fa-
cial expression [72], and object recognition [73] . The attributes
of biological motor control have been covered by autonomous
movement in humanoid robots [74], while learning to drive has
been covered through autonomous driving systems [75]. Al-
though these fields have emerged, there are a number of chal-
lenges that include those in computer vision and speech recog-
nition, especially in dealing with noisy and dynamic environ-
ments in real-world applications [76, 77].
The field of natural language processing aims to make com-
puter systems understand and manipulate natural languages to
perform the desired tasks [78]. It has been one of the major
attributes of cognition and consciousness [79]. One of the
major breakthroughs that used natural language processing for
cognitive computing has been the design of Watson, which is
a system capable of answering questions posed in natural lan-
guage developed by David Ferrucci [80, 81]. Watson won the
game of Jeopardy against human players [82]. It had access
to 200 million pages of structured and unstructured content in-
cluding the full text of Wikipedia. Moreover, IBM Watson was
not connected to the Internet during the game. There are a num-
ber of applications of Watson technology that includes various
forms of search that have semantic properties. Specially, Wat-
son has a high potential for health care for an evidence-based
clinical decision support system that affords exploration of a
broad range of hypotheses and their associated evidence [83].
Furthermore, it can help in developing breakthrough research in
medical and life sciences with a further focus on Big Data chal-
lenges . Hence, it was shown that Watson can accelerate the
identification of novel drug candidates and novel drug targets
by harnessing the potential of big data [84].
With such a breakthrough for development of Watson for
cognitive computing, there remains deep philosophical ques-
tions from perspective of natural and artificial consciousness
[85]. Koch evaluated Watson’s level of consciousnesses from
perspective of integrated information theory of consciousnesses
[86, 22] that views the level of consciousness based on com-
plexity and how integrated the forms of information are in the
system. Watsons capabilities motivated to further study the phi-
losophy, theory, and future of artificial intelligence based upon
Leibnizs computational formal logic that inspired a ’scorecard’
approach to assessing cognitive systems [87]. Metacognition
refers to a higher order thinking skills that includes knowledge
about when and how to use particular strategies for learning or
for problem solving [88]. In relation to metacognition, Wat-
son relied on a skill very similar to human self-knowledge as
it not only came up with answers but also generated a confi-
dence rating for them. Therefore, Watson possessed elements
of metacognition similar to the human counterparts in the game
of Jeopardy [89]. More recently, AlphaGo was developed by
Google to play the board game Go which became the first pro-
gram to beat a professional human player without handicaps
on a full-sized 19 × 19 board [90]. It used deep learning and
learned abstract information from visual board data given by
experts. Then it played against itself across multiple computers
through reinforcement learning. Although AlphaGo has been
very successful, one can argue that it demonstrated a very con-
strained aspect of human intelligence that may not necessarily
display consciousness.
Furthermore, ethics and morality are considered as one of
the fundamental aspects of human consciousness. Hence, one
of the future challenges will be to feature attributes of morality
in artificial consciousness. There have been questions about the
moral aspects of the rise of robotic or digital systems that will
have a certain level of consciousness [91, 92, 93]. Colin et. al
proposed moral Turing test with the hope to attain moral per-
fection in computational systems [91]. Parthemore and Whitby
questioned the requirements of a moral agent has been also pre-
sented a number of conceptual pre-conditions for being a moral
agent [92]. Arnold and Scheutz argued against moral Turing
test and proposed system of verification which demands the de-
sign of transparent, accountable processes of reasoning for the
performance of autonomous systems [93]. The issues related to
morality would need to be integrated with systems that feature
artificial consciousness as it could have a wide range of impli-
cations in cases when the system is given tasks, or in charge
of making decisions that pose a danger to living systems. This
raises further philosophical questions on the implications of ar-
tificial consciousness.
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3. An affective computational model
3.1. Preliminaries
Humans have long desired a future when advances in
robotics will help solve some of the challenges facing human-
ity. It is well-known that advances in robotics and artificial in-
telligence provide potential for advances in health and agricul-
ture. There is hope for addressing some of the most challeng-
ing problems such as the need for food, water, and shelter. One
would be glad to have a humanoid robot that can plant for the
entire household and also help in preparation of food and house-
hold actives. However, this will also give rise to philosophical
and ethical issues. The implementation of machine conscious-
ness in technological systems will affect human workforce, so-
cial behaviour and culture.
The rapid advances in emerging technologies such as Internet
of Things (IoT) [94] is leading to increasingly large collection
of data. IoT has the potential to improve the health, transporta-
tion, education, agriculture and other related industries. Apart
from the dimensionality of the data, there are other challenging
factors that include complexity and heterogeneous datasets [95]
which makes the area of big data challenging [96, 97]. Recent
success in the area of deep learning [98, 99] for computer vi-
sion and speech recognition tasks have given motivation for the
future implementation of conscious machines. Howsoever, this
raises deeper questions on the nature of consciousness and if
deep learning with big data can lead to features that contribute
or form some level of consciousness. Through the perspective
of integrated information theory (IIT) [21, 23], complex struc-
tures in the model with feedback loops could lead to certain de-
grees of consciousness. Therefore, from the deep learning per-
spective, conventional convolutional networks do not fall into
this category as they do not have feedback connections. How-
ever, if we consider recurrent neural networks [100], some of
the architectures with additional information processing would
fall in the category of consciousness from the perspective of
IIT. The challenge remains in incorporating them as compo-
nents form part of a larger model for machine consciousness
[101]. In such model, deep learning, IoT, and big data would
replicate sensory perception.
Once the simulation of input sensor organs is addressed
(speech and vision), the challenge of an effective model of ma-
chine consciousness would be to make sense of the data and
also provide higher level organization of knowledge obtained
from data in which resembles thought processes and reasoning.
The field of the semantic web has faced a similar challenge that
tries to make sense of data from web content using resource
description framework (RDF) which is a set of specifications
originally designed as a metadata data model [102]. It incorpo-
rates machine learning and optimization through so-called web
intelligence [103]. They have been implemented in social net-
works and search engines [104] and also further enhanced by
cognitive computing technologies such as Watson [105].
3.2. Affective model with simulation of natural properties
There has not much been done to incorporate emotional
states and personality in models of machine consciousness. It
was not addressed as in the past due to the limited motivation
for software systems and robotics which mostly was aimed to
address problems without taking into account of the human feel
or touch which is recently being addressed through the field of
affective computing. However, affective computing has yet not
fully addressed its implications on machine consciousness. Fur-
ther challenge is to address the hard problem which refers to the
explanatory gap of describing conscious experience [106, 107].
We begin with the proposition where we view the human
brain as hardware and mind as computational software [108].
The computational software can also be viewed as an operating
system that consists several layers and components that work
coherently as a control system [109]. We note that states in con-
sciousnesses are perturbed though emotional experiences [110].
There has been a study on the links between emotion with con-
sciousness where it was suggested that emotional processing is
important for maintaining a sense of ownership necessary for
any conscious experience [111]. The state or health of the brain
has direct implications for consciousness. For instance, in an
extreme case, someone being injured with brain damage can
become unconscious and enter a vegetative state [112]. Such
natural defective states of consciousness resemble damages of
a computer hardware components such as memory and storage
devices or even one of the processors.
Figure 1 highlights the difference in physical (hardware) and
metaphysical components (computational software) that form
consciousness. Although the metaphysical features such as cre-
ativity and thought processes could be classified as software,
simulating them is difficult. For instance, the input for a vision-
based robotic system would be information in terms of videos
or images. The software would be the machine learning and
data processing components that carry out tasks such as face
or facial expression recognition. Creativity, on the other hand,
would be seen as a philosophical attribute or feature of con-
sciousness. Creativity is not just about artistic expressions such
as fine arts or music, but about the ability to tackle problems
from “out of the box”. Stimulating creativity would be a very
challenging aspect of any models of consciousness and hence
we limit our current affective model which views creativity as a
black-box.
Moving on, we revisit the natural states of consciousness and
incorporate components that fall between physical and meta-
physical states in order to address the hard problems such as
conscious experience as shown in Figure 1. In our proposed af-
fective model, we view the conscious experience as a state that
enables management of all the states. In doing so, it can change
states depending on the “present” and “future” goal as shown
in Figure 4. Furthermore, the affective model is developed with
the following propositions.
• Proposition 1 : Being conscious and unconscious are states of
the whole phenomenon of consciousness. The model views the
sleep versus waking states and the major states of consciousness.
• Proposition 2: While being conscious, there is awareness. On
the other hand, while being unconsciousness, there is a certain
level of awareness and attention which are given or used in dream
states.
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Figure 1: Overlap in states with difference in physical (hard-
ware) and meta-physical components (software).
• Proposition 3: A thinking mind is generation or information
which can be viewed as random walks in a network of infor-
mation where there is an certain level priority to that information
with attention based on certain goals or emotional states. The
thinking mind generates different types of thoughts depending
on the problem at hand, the level of intelligence, depth of knowl-
edge and experience.
Hence, the difference of wakeful and sleep states (conscious
versus unconsciousness) is merely the participation of the body
using motor control [113]. In dreaming state, one has a vir-
tual body which exhibits various actions, that are possible and
also not possible (walking and flying) [114, 115, 116]. Hence,
during dream states, there is conscious awareness. Moreover,
the person in a dream state cannot distinguish the difference
whether the events are happening in real-life or in a dream. In
several levels of dream states, one may think that the situation
is real which asks further raises questions of the difference be-
tween a dream and awake states. We limit our affective model
from such philosophical interpretations, while at the same time,
acknowledge them. We note that there is a hypothesis about the
simulated universe and whether humans are subject to a grand
simulation experiment [117].
The elements of pain and pleasure are central driving and
features of consciousness [118]. In any artificial conscious sys-
tem, their existence would influence in the overall emotional
state of the artificial conscious system. The literature has the
interest has been largely in trying to replicate a level of con-
sciousness, without much interest in the future of robotics with
an affective or emotive features that make robots look and feel
more human or natural. The demand of humanoid robotics as
services to humans, the needs for the human touch in robots
will grow. Personality is an attribute of consciousness that de-
fines the way one expresses their affections or emotions and also
handles everyday problems and situations that range in a wide
range of settings which includes family, work and community.
Figure 2: An illustration of animal versus machine conscious-
ness in addressing some of the elements such as ’pain’, ’hunger’
and ’tiredness’.
It is through one’s personality, that they have a certain view of
life that also related to moral behaviour and ethical constructs
for behaviour. Current models of machine consciousness are
not addressing these aspects even though they may not address
the hard problems, some elements of affective behaviour could
be replicated.
Personality could be seen as an attribute of consciousness
that grows with time and experience. It determines how one ap-
proaches a problem as the behaviour and intrinsic qualities of
the person. Although the changes in our emotions makes mood
that contributes to the state of consciousness, the core iden-
tity of consciousness remains the same, i.e we feel the same
consciousness as a child or and adult although we have gone
through varied learning experiences. This is an important as-
pect of the hard problem. In developing machine consciousness
or implementing in it humanoid robotics, one can acknowledge
the hard problem but to solve it is not necessary for attaining
systems that have some level of affective consciousness.
Hence, such systems would have similar principle as a par-
rot trying to replicate the conscious behaviour - which may be
just repeating some words without understanding it. In our
analogy of humanoid robotic with affective consciousness, it
would be carrying out a task and display behaviour that gener-
ate some emotion or has the human spirit or touch, but whether
it is conscious about it would be a philosophical discussion.
Since the proposed model has not addressed the hard problem
with any definition or discussion but just acknowledged its pres-
ence of conscious experience with an identity - i.e some state
that is “the observer” or the “one which experiences”. We are
not modelling the observer as its nature has yet not fully been
grasped the the respective scientific fields. However, in the sec-
tion to follow, we will provide a means for management of at-
tributes of consciousness through an artificial qualia which aids
the “observer” as the goal is to have future implementations of
affective computational model for robotics.
There are some intrinsic and extrinsic motivations that lead to
the desire to reach our goals. Once a goal is established, every-
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day challenges such as the state of pain, hunger, and tiredness
remain. These states could be catered in the affective model
of machine consciousness which could be helpful in addressing
some of the software and hardware requirements. Currently,
there are challenges in mobile computing, where at times, the
battery life is running low or too many processes slow down the
system. These could be seen analogous to challenges in animal
consciousness such as pain and tiredness. Figure 2 provides an
illustration of the elements that form a major part in making a
close link of animal and machine consciousness. It shows how
the challenges could be addressed while making certain actions
to achieve the goal.
We present the following definitions for developing the af-
fective computational model of machine consciousness.
• Definition 1: Any phenomenal observation is viewed as infor-
mation. Computational software processes the information with
knowledge which is either inbuilt or gained through learning
from experience or a combination of them.
• Definition 2: Consciousness is based on attributes that have qual-
ities, states, and instincts.
• Definition 3: The quality of consciousness are those that are in-
built, inherited or born qualities such as personality, intelligence
and creativity.
• Definition 4: The states of consciousness are those that mostly
change with phenomenal experience such as emotions, expres-
sions and motor control.
• Definition 5: The instinctive property of consciousness are those
that have minimum conscious control such as body processes
such as ageing, hunger and pain.
With the above definitions, we address affective notions
that include emotional states, behaviour, and expressions [110]
while taking into account the personality, knowledge and in-
stincts as shown in Table 1. Note that the table forms basis
for propositions based on observations only. Moreover, some
of the identified qualities such as personality is a more rigid
quality which may or may not change over time depending on
its influence from birth. The property that make the quality are
merely those that we are born with or gained naturally, although
some may change over time such as knowledge and creativity.
3.3. Problem scenarios
Based on the prepositions in previous section 3.2, we pro-
vide the details of the affective model and then present few
problem scenarios that are intended to demonstrate its effective-
ness. Figure 3 shows a general view of state-based information
processing based on experience which acts as input or action
while the response acts as the reaction given by behavior or ex-
pression. Depending on the experience, there is an expression
which would be involuntarily stored as either long or short-term
memory depending on the nature of the experience. Moreover,
there is also conceptual understanding of implications to the ob-
server and how it changes their long and short-time goals. The
output in terms of action or expression could also be either vol-
untary or involuntary. In some situations, one reacts without
Property Quality State Instinct Implication
Personality x - - D, B, and M
Intelligence x - - D, and B
Creativity x - - D, and B
Knowledge x x - D, B and M
Memory x x - D, B, and M
Extra-Sensory Percep. x x - D
Emotions - x - D, andB
Expression - x - B
Motor Control - x - B
Pain - - x M, and B
Hunger - - x M, and B
Bodily functions - - x M, and B
Table 1: Properties of the affective computational model. D
refers to decision making, B refers to behaviour, and M refers
to motivation. x marks the presence of the attributes (Quality,
State and Instinct)
controlling their emotions while in others, one does not react
in haste. A conscious decision is made depending on the type
of personality, depth of knowledge (machine learning models)
from past experience (audio, visual and other data).
Figure 4 shows an over overview of the affective model of
consciousness that is inter-related with Figure 3. The states in
Figure 4 shown in blue represent the metaphysical while those
in black are the physical states. Note that by physical, it im-
plies that they do have metaphysical (computational software)
properties but the physical nature influences these states.
We provide accounts of situations that require problem-
solving skills which feature different states of consciousness.
We first give the description of the scenario and then show how
it will be tackled by the proposed affective model. We provide
three distinct scenarios as follows.
Scenario 1: Raman is traveling on a flight from India to
Japan and has a connecting flight from Shanghai, China. His
flight lands in Shanghai and he is required to make it to the
connecting flight gate. Raman’s boarding pass has gate infor-
mation missing and since his flight landed about and hour late,
he needs to rush to the connecting gate. Raman is not sure if
he will pass through the immigration authority. His major goal
is to reach a connecting flight gate. In doing so, he is required
to gather information about his gate and whether he will go
through the immigration processing counter. He encounters a
series of emotions which includes fear of losing the connect-
ing flight and hence exhibits a number of actions that show his
emotive psycho-physical states which include sweating, exag-
gerating while speaking and even shivering due to fear.
In order for Raman to successfully make it to the connecting
flight on time, he will undergo a series of states in conscious-
nesses which is described in detail with state references from
Figure 4 as follows.
1. Exit flight and find the way to transfer desk.
(a) Search for information regarding “transfers and arrivals”
through vision recognition system (State 2 and then State
6).
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Figure 3: Output response from input after processing through features that contribute to consciousness
Figure 4: Note that consciousness observer is defined as the root of consciousness. Conscious experience is the core, which can
enter different states while also having the property to exist within two states, i.e it can self-replicate as a process, gather knowledge
and update long and short-term memories, and then merge into the root conscious observer. The blue states are metaphysical and
black states are physical.
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(b) Process information and make decision to move to the area
of “transfers” (State 2 and State 5).
2. Since information that no baggage needs to be collected was al-
ready given, check boarding pass for baggage tag sticker.
(a) Process visual information by checking boarding pass
(State 2 and 6)
3. Confirm with the officer at transfer desk if need to go through
migration.
(a) Find and walk to transfer desk (State 2, 6, and 5)
(b) Communicate with the officer at transfer desk (State 2 and
6)
(c) Fear and emotions during communication (State 2, 5, 8,
and 10)
4. Information was given by the officer that there is a need to go
through immigration booth, hence, prepare boarding pass and
passport.
(a) Rush to the immigration processing section (State 5 and 6).
(b) Wait in queue and go through a number of emotions such
as fear of losing flight and also sweat (State 5, 6, 8, and
10).
5. After immigration processing, find gate information and move to
gate and board connecting flight.
(a) Rush to the gate. In the process breath heavily and also
sweat (State 2, 5, and 6).
(b) Wait at the gate with some random thoughts and then board
when called (State 7, 8, 6, 2 and 5).
Scenario 2: Thomas is in a mall in Singapore for his regular
Saturday movies and shopping with friends. Suddenly, he real-
izes that he can’t locate his phone. He brainstorms about the
last few moments when he used his phone. He goes through a
series of intense emotive states that includes fear.
In order for Thomas to successfully find his phone, he will
undergo a series of states in consciousnesses with reference
from Figure 4 as follows.
1. Thomas first informed his friends and began checking all his
pockets and carry bag.
(a) Check all pockets (State 5 and 6).
(b) Inform friends and also check in carry bag (State 6, 8, 10,
and 5)
2. Brainstorm where was last time phone was used.
(a) Ask friends when they last saw him using the phone (State
6, 8, and 10).
(b) Try to remember when phone was last used (State 2 and 9).
(c) Finally, take a moment of a deep breath and relax in order
to remember (State 2, 9, and 3).
3. Recalled information that phone was last used in cinema and then
rush there to check.
(a) Recalled that phone was last used in cinema (State 1, 3, 7,
and 9).
(b) Inform friends with emotive expression of hope and
achievement (State 6 and 8).
(c) Rush to the cinema and talk to the attendant with emotive
state of hope and fear (State 5, 6 and 8).
(d) Attendant locates the phone and informs (State 6).
(e) Emotive state of joy and achievement (State 8).
Figure 5: The journey of reaching a goal from audio visual data.
3.4. Artificial Qualia Manager
We have presented affective computational model of machine
consciousness with the motivation to replicate elements of hu-
man consciousness. This can exhibit characteristics with hu-
man touch with emotive states through synergy with affective
computing. There is a need for management of components
in the affective model which would help the property of con-
sciousness experience. Hence, there is a need for a manager for
qualia. This could be seen as a root algorithm that manages the
states with features that can assign the states based on the goal
and the needs (instincts) and qualities (such as personality and
knowledge).
The artificial qualia manager could be modelled with the un-
derlying principle of a security guard that monitors a number
of video feedbacks from security cameras and also has radio
communication with other security guards and needs to follow
a channel of communication strategies if any risks or security
impeachment occurs. Figure 5 shows an example that include
processing through machine learning for semantic information
which is used by the artificial qualia manager to assign the list
of states needed for the goal. Similarly, the artificial qualia
manager would be overseeing all the status of the states and as-
signing jobs for reaching the goal through automated reasoning
in machine consciousness as given in Algorithm 1.
In Algorithm 1, the goal and data from audio and visual in-
puts are used to determine and effectively manage the sequence
of states of affective model of consciousness presented in Fig-
ure 4. Once the goal is reached, a series of states can be used
for expression which can include a set of emotions. Note that
audio and visual data needs to undergo through processing with
machine learning tools which would then output some informa-
tion. For instance, if the goal is regarding finding date infor-
mation for a boarding pass, then the task would be to be first
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Data: Data from sensory perception (video, audio, and sensor
data)
Result: States for consciousness
Initialization ( knowledge and personality) ;
statelist[]← list of states;
goal← gaol to reach ;
means[]← list of actions with reference to statelist[] required to
reach goal;
while alive do
traversestates(goal, statelist[]);
while goal not reached do
if challenge then
nominate a state;
attend to challenge (injury, pain, emotion) ;
store short-term and long-term memory;
end
if goal reached (success) then
output through expression (action, gesture,
emotion);
store short-term and long-term memory;
end
if goal not reached (failure) then
output through expression (action, gesture,
emotion);
store short-term and long-term memory;
end
end
1. Generate random thoughts based on problem and emotion
;
2. Automated reasoning and planning for states needed for
future goal(s) ;
3. Address the requirements to revisit failed goals ;
end
Algorithm 1: Artificial Qualia Manager
Figure 6: Affective computational model states for the Artificial
Qualia Manager
to translate this higher level task into a sequence of lower level
tasks that would execute machine learning components. After
these components are triggered, they would return information
which will be used by the algorithm to make further decision of
states needed to reach the goal. This is illustrated in Figure 6
There needs to a be a property of states for tasks based on
their importance. For instance, we give priority to emergency
situations while trying to fill a goal. While fulfilling a goal, we
would give priority to aspects such as safety and security. The
goal could be similar to those given in Scenario 1 and Scenario
2 where Raman boards connecting flight and Thomas locates
his phone, respectively.
3.5. Implementation strategies
The affective computational model can feature multi-task
learning for replicating sensory perception through recognition
task that includes vision, sensory input for touch and smell
and auditory tasks such as speech verification, speech recogni-
tion, and speaker verification. Shared knowledge representation
would further be used for recognition of objects, faces or facial
expression where visual and auditory signals would be used in
conjunction to make a decision. Multi-task learning is moti-
vated by cognitive behavior where the underlying knowledge
from one task is helpful to one or several other tasks. Hence,
multi-task learning employs sharing of fundamental knowledge
across tasks [119, 120].
In the identification of objects, we learn through the experi-
ence of different senses that can be seen as a modular input to
biological neural system [121]. Modular learning would help
in decision making in cases where one of the signals is not
available [122]. For instance, a humanoid robot is required to
recognize someone in the dark when no visual signal is avail-
able, it would be able to make a decision based on the auditory
signal. Ensemble learning could take advantage of several ma-
chine learning models which can also include deep learning for
visual or auditory based recognition systems [98]. Ensemble
learning can also be used to address multi-label learning where
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Figure 7: Use of machine learning and artificial intelligence
concepts for implementation of machine consciousness
instances have multiple labels which is different from multi-
class learning [123].
The visual recognition process also relies on information
from the peripheral vision which is a part of the vision that oc-
curs outside the very center of gaze to make decision[124, 125,
126]. Mostly, we focus our attention or gaze to the frontal vi-
sual system. Similar ways of attention and focus can be used
for auditory systems and would be helpful for advanced speech
recognition systems. This is especially when one needs to give
attention to the specific voice in a noise and dynamic environ-
ment. We naturally adjust our hearing to everyday situations
when some parts of sensory inputs are either unavailable or are
too noisy as trying to understand what someone is saying in
environments with sudden background noise. The feature of
modularity will be very helpful in the development of cognitive
systems for machine consciousness that need to be dynamic and
robust. Figure 7 gives an overview of implementation strategies
where machine learning methodologies are used for replicating
sensory input through audio and visual recognition systems.
4. Discussion
Although the feature of creativity, reasoning, self-awareness
are the essential component of consciousness, modeling them
for aspects of machine consciousness will become the great-
est challenges in the near future. The absence of these fea-
tures will highly differentiate artificial systems or humanoid
robots from humans and will give special qualities to the hu-
man workforce and hence some would argue against simulat-
ing them [127]. We note that self-awareness is a critical com-
ponent of consciousness which has not been fully addressed
by the proposed affective model which views conscious expe-
rience (observer) as awareness. Howsoever, these could have
different philosophical interpretations as in the spiritual litera-
ture [39], self-awareness is known to emerge at higher states of
consciousness or conscious experience [43]. The spiritual liter-
ature views non-thinking or meditative state as the highest state
of consciousness [128]. In this state, one can evaluate their own
behavior and responses to problems and situations which can
also be seen as the ability to have introspection and metacogni-
tion [129, 89, 88] . The challenges in machine consciousness is
to incorporate features with fundamental models that replicate
different states of consciousness which align with information
processing from sense organs. Furthermore, intuition and cre-
ativity are also major features of consciousness and it could be
argued that they form the truly metaphysical properties of con-
sciousness. By metaphysical, we refer to the aspects that tran-
scendent thoughts or notions that cannot be defined through lan-
guage but have an impact on emotions or a certain sense of per-
ception [130]. It is difficult to determine whether other animals,
who are less intelligent have conscious experience. Howsoever,
they do have levels of cognitive problem solving, perception,
navigation, planning, and affections. All of these attributes are
also present in humans, and therefore, any artificial conscious
system that exhibits these properties will face the same chal-
lenges or philosophical questions if animals have consciousness
or conscious experience.
It is important to realise the potential of animal conscious-
ness as it can motivate models for consciousness that full the
gaps in models for human consciousness. In simulation or the
need to implant certain level of consciousnesses to robotic sys-
tems, it would be reasonable to begin with animal level where
certain tasks can be achieved. For instance, a robotic system
that can replicate cognitive abilities and level of consciousness
for rats can be used for some tasks such as burrowing holes,
navigation in unconstrained areas for feedback of videos or in-
formation, in disasters such as earthquakes and exploration of
remote places, and evacuation sites.
Deep learning, data science and analytics can further help in
contribution towards certain or very limited areas of machine
consciousness. This is primary to artificially replicate areas of
sensory input such as artificial speech recognition and artificial
vision or perception. Howsoever, with such advancements in
artificially replicating sensory perceptions, one encounters fur-
ther challenges in developing software systems that oversee or
synchronise different aspects of perceptions that lead to a con-
sciousness state. Howsoever, to reach a state of natural con-
sciousness will be difficult for machines as creativity and self-
awareness is not just biological, but also considered spiritual
which is challenging to define.
With the rise of technologies such as IoT, sensors could be
used to replicate biological attributes such as pain, emotions,
feeling of strength and tiredness. However, modelling these at-
tributes and attaining same behaviour in humans may not nec-
essarily mean that the affective model of consciousness would
solve hard problem that enables conscious experience. How-
ever, at least the model would be seen to exhibit conscious
experience that will be similar to humans and other animals.
Such an affective model, with future implementations could
give rise to household robotic pets that would have or could
develop emotional relationship with humans. We must be care-
ful about affective model when in giving autonomous control or
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decision making through simulated emotional behaviour. Hu-
mans are well known to be poor decision makers when in emo-
tional states which also resort to level of aggression and vio-
lence. Therefore, simulation of affective states need to take into
account of safety and security for any future robotic implemen-
tations that assist humans.
The proposed affective model has not considered any differ-
ence between conscious experience during sleep and waking
state from the perspective of awareness [24]. This is due to
the difference in the definition of awareness from the sleep and
waking state [131]. We note that artificial systems do not need
elements such as the sleep state as its a property of a biologi-
cal nervous system where sleep is required. Moreover, during
the sleep state, dreams are persistent and their importance has
been an important study in psychology [115], but may not have
implications for the affective model of consciousness.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
The paper presented an affective computational model for
machine consciousness with the motivation to feature the emo-
tive attributes which give a more human-like experience for arti-
ficial systems. The affective model can become the foundation
for developing artificial systems that can assist humans while
appearing as natural as possible.
The challenges lie in further refining specific features such
as personality and creativity which are psycho-physically chal-
lenging to study and hence pose limitations to the affective
model of consciousness. Howsoever, the proposed effective
model can be a baseline and motivate the coming decade of
simulation and implementation of machine consciousness for
artificial systems such as humanoid robots. The simulation
for affective model of consciousness with the features of arti-
ficial qualia manager can also be implemented with the use of
robotics hardware. In their absence, simulation can also be im-
plemented through collection of audiovisual data and definition
of certain goals. The affective model is general and does not
only apply to humanoid robots, but can be implemented in ser-
vice application areas of software systems and technology.
Future directions can be in areas of artificial personality and
artificially creative systems. These can be done by incorporat-
ing advancing technologies such as IoT, semantic web, cogni-
tive computing and machine learning, along with artificial gen-
eral intelligence.
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